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Abstract 
Previous studies suggest that citizens' attitudes towards the European Union (EU) are influenced by 
media coverage of EU institutions and policies. To date, empirical studies have investigated the effects 
of TV and newspaper consumption on euro-skepticism. However, the role of the Internet remains 
under-explored. In this study we combine data on broadband availability with respondent geo-location 
data from the 2011 Irish National Election Study, which allows us to measure whether respondents 
live in an area with broadband coverage. We use this dataset to perform a quasi-experimental analysis 
that identifies the effect of online news-gathering on citizens' evaluations of the extent to which the 
European Union and the Euro are culpable for the current economic crisis. To allow for heterogeneous 
treatment effects, we implement local average response functions (LARF) in our analysis. We find that 
those citizens who source political information online are more prone to blame the EU for 
(mis)managing the current economic crisis than those who do not. 
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Introduction
Omne ignotum pro magnifico.
Cornelio Tacito, Julii Agricolae Vita
In this article we examine the extent to which use of the Internet as a source of political
news affects citizens’ attribution of blame to the European Union and to the Euro for the
post-September 2008 economic collapse. With the global financial system in the midst
of arguably the most severe and prolonged crisis of the post-war era, there is currently
a considerable amount of political blame going around. Recent contributions on citizens’
attribution of blame have mostly focused on the role of party cues (Hellwig and Cioffey
2011; Malhotra and Kuo 2008; Malhotra and Margailt 2008), whereas we approach the
issue by focusing on media effects. Specifically, we seek to assess the effects on public
opinion of online news-gathering in a country that was particularly impacted by the crisis
- the Republic of Ireland. Ireland is an ideal laboratory for our exercise given that the cur-
rent economic downturn has assumed a strong supra-national dimension as a consequence
of the EU/ECB/IMF bailout granted in November 2010.
Although the mass adoption of Internet technologies across the EU has dramatically
changed the European media landscape, the impact of the web on citizens’ attitudes to-
wards the EU is currently empirically under-explored. The question that we pose here is
whether exposure to the Internet, a medium that radically alters the costs of diffusion of
information and opinions, influences citizens’ opinions towards the EU; in particular with
regard to how citizens attribute responsibility for economic mismanagement.
We argue here that the Internet represents a source of information and opinions that
do not tend to find oxygen in traditional media. In the Irish case this means that the
web is a considerably more euro-skeptic environment than off-line media. We further ar-
gue that in a context of economic crisis and information overload, negative messages will
have a strong effect on citizens opinions and we therefore theorize that voters who consume
news online will attribute higher levels of blame to the EU for the on-going economic crisis.
We use data collected by the Irish National Election Study (INES) shortly after the
2011 general election to examine the manner in which Irish citizens attribute blame for
the financial crisis to the EU and the Euro. Our econometric strategy closely follows a
number of recent studies that have made use of variation in media accessibility to analyse
media effects (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Enikolopov et al. 2011; Kern and Hainmueller
2009). Specifically, we make use of geographical variation in the availability of broadband
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in Ireland to instrument online news- gathering. This methodological approach allows us
to examine the causal impact of politicized Internet use on citizens evaluations of the EU.
We find robust evidence that citizens who access political information on the Inter-
net are more likely to blame the EU for (mis)managing the current economic crisis and
to blame the Euro for worsening its effects. Our paper has two important implications.
Firstly, our findings cast doubt on the argument that more informed citizens tend to be in
favour of the EU and that Euro-skepticism is nurtured by lack of knowledge of EU policies
(Sattler and Urpelainen 2012). In our study, web users prove to be simultaneously polit-
ically well-informed and critical of anti-crisis policies implemented by the EU. Secondly,
our results indicate that the Internet can lead to exacerbation of extreme views. We stress
that such a process is somewhat lop-sided during economic crises, when negative messages
have a stronger impact than positive ones. Thus, while the Internet is a source of political
knowledge, it can also increase the risk of citizens acquiring noisy information. Both of
these insights lead us to conclude that the effects of online news-gathering on an array of
political opinions should be further investigated.
In the next section, we review the literature on media effects in relation to citizens’
evaluations of the European Union. In section two, we elaborate on the political context
within which this study takes place by briefly outlining Ireland’s current economic situation
and its relationship with the EU/ECB/IMF. In section three, we present our theory. We
then introduce our data and outline our methodological approach in section four. In
section five, we present our main results. We then show additional evidence that further
validates our findings. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our study for
future research.
1 Mediated Information and Political Attitudes
Empirical research on the effects of media consumption on political behaviour dates back
to the 1940s (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson et al. 1954). However, the broad consensus
on the ‘minimal effects’ thesis among these early studies tended to discourage further re-
search. In the early 1990s, Bartels went so far as to describe the research on media effects
as “one of the most notable embarrassments of modern social science” (1993, 267). Since
this withering assessment, however, a large number of scholars have engaged in research
seeking to identify and quantify the influence of media consumption on the opinions held
and behaviors exhibited by voters, leading to an erosion of the confidence in the contention
that media effects are ‘minimal’. Several recent studies point to the existence of identi-
fiable and significant effects of mass media exposure on political opinions and behaviors,
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once appropriate estimation techniques are implemented (Stromberg 2004; Gerber, Kar-
lan and Bergan 2007; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Enikolopov et al. 2011; Kern and
Haimuller 2009; Ladd and Lenz 2009; Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya 2010).
The effects of mediated information are especially crucial in determining citizens’ atti-
tudes towards the EU because of a widespread lack of knowledge of EU politics and policies,
and a general lack of understanding of EU institutions and mechanisms, among members
of the European public (Dalton and Duval 1986; Hobolt 2006; Sattler and Urpelainen
2012). The challenge of political communication in nation states is amplified in the EU –
a political project that spans an entire continent, but where, as Dalton and Duval observe,
“very few citizens have first- or even second-hand contact with Community affairs in Brus-
sels” (1986, 186). Citizens are thus particularly dependent on mediated coverage when
forming opinions about the functioning of the EU (Norris 2000). Indeed, citizens have
repeatedly reported that they rely heavily on television and newspapers as their principal
sources of information on the EU (Eurobarometer 2007). As such, TV and newspapers
are natural targets for scholars interested in understanding the role of mediated informa-
tion in the formation of citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. However, content analyses
have revealed that national broadcasters and newspapers consistently pay low levels of
attention to EU affairs (Anderson and McLeod 2004; De Vreese 2002; Meyer 2005) and
scholars have repeatedly pointed to the non-emergence of a European-level media system
or ‘public sphere’ (Grimm 2004; Scharpf 1999; Schlesinger 1999).
In spite of the low level of visibility of European affairs in national media, a number of
empirical studies have explored media effects on citizens attitudes towards project Europe.
Work in this tradition has been mostly experimental or quasi-experimental in nature. The
exposure of treatment groups to specific media content has been used to explain opin-
ions on the EU generally (De Vreese and Boomgarden 2003; Semetko, Van der Brug and
Valkenburg 2003); support for EU enlargement (Schuck and De Vreese 2006); or support
for the accession of specific countries (for example, Maier and Rittberger 2008). Mediated
information has been consistently shown to exercise an identifiable effect on citizens’ eval-
uations of EU affairs, with intense media coverage being linked to increases in citizens’
levels of knowledge of the EU (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006). In terms of electoral
politics, Banducci and Semetko (2004) conclude that individuals are more likely to turn
out to vote in EP elections in media environments where the election campaign is featured
prominently. To date, however, no scholarly attention has been paid to the questions of
whether and how the Internet weighs into this process.
Overall, the literature that informs our research provides us with two solid assump-
tions. First, the mass media influence citizens’ political and electoral behavior, ceteris
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paribus. Second, national media play a primary role in the formation of opinions towards
the EU, mainly because EU citizens have limited direct experience of the functioning of the
EU on which to base their opinions. However, these assumptions do not, in themselves,
provide us with specific theoretical expectations about how the Internet may influence
public opinion towards the EU. One reason for this is that that the Internet is substan-
tially different from newspapers, radio and television, which are the objects of interest
of every previous published study concerned with the identification of the causal mech-
anisms relating media to attitudes towards and behavior within the EU. Moreover, we
are concerned with attribution of blame in the context of the current economic crisis, in
a country that was affected particularly severely by the economic downturn. Therefore,
before formulating our theory and working hypothesis, we provide a short overview of the
Irish case in relation to the EU.
2 The Irish Economic Meltdown
The story of Ireland’s political and economic development in the 21st century reads some-
what like a Victorian morality tale. A period of extraordinary economic growth from the
mid-1990s onwards led the Irish economy to be described as ‘the Celtic Tiger’ - a phrase
that rapidly became part of Ireland’s popular and political parlance. However, much of
this growth was driven by what eventually turned out to be a property bubble - fueled by
a global supply of cheap and easy credit. In late 2008, this supply of credit was abruptly
cut off - revealing spectacular holes in the balance sheets of most of Ireland’s major banks
(Murphy 2011).
When the heads of the distressed banks met with the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister),
Finance Minister, and a small number of senior civil servants in the small hours of the
morning on September 30th, 2008 - ostensibly to discuss an impending ‘run’ on Anglo-Irish
bank, the true scale of the Irish banking system’s losses were unknown to the government.
Nonetheless, the government issued a guarantee on behalf of the state, covering the liabil-
ities of all of Ireland’s troubled banks. This decision was a truly momentous one - state
exposure under the guarantee was reported to run to 330 billion euros, although the pub-
lic was reassured by Finance Minister Brian Lenihan, who announced that Ireland’s bank
bailout would be ‘the cheapest in the world’. Unfortunately, as Mair’s (2011, 3) account
makes clear, the government’s decision was ill-informed: “the banks had not been upfront
about their liabilities, and the guarantee was eventually to encompass a much larger sum
than was envisaged”. Carswell (2011) estimates the gross cost of the bailout at 40 percent
of Ireland’s GDP.
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This costly bailout of Ireland’s banks necessarily coincided with the collapse of Ire-
land’s property bubble - leading to disastrous unemployment and GDP growth figures.
The fiscal gap created by these circumstances, and Ireland’s inability to finance its out-
goings on the international bond markets led to the EU/ECB/IMF conditional bailout
of the Irish exchequer in November, 2010. Subsequently, and in shambolic circumstances
(Murphy 2011), the Fianna Fa´il/Green coalition government collapsed and a general elec-
tion was held on February 25th, 2011. The results saw both government parties electorally
obliterated, and a Fine Gael/Labour coalition taking office.
The new government not only struggled to enact campaign promises to renegotiate
the terms of the bailout granted by EU/ECB/IMF but also introduced a raft of new taxes
while cutting public expenditure. Therefore, the May 31st 2012 Fiscal Compact refer-
endum unsurprisingly saw the ‘No’ side tying the terms of the Compact with on-going
austerity policies. ‘Vote No to Austerity’ was a dominant narrative on the ‘No’ side -
with Sinn Fein and the United Left Alliance being the parliamentary parties adopting
this stance (we therefore control for support for these two parties in our analysis below).
The ‘Yes’ side, comprised of the government parties and Fianna Fa´il, argued that voting
Yes was essential to securing on-going funding for the Irish state, and adopted a ‘Yes to
Stability, Growth and Employment’ frame. The referendum was ultimately approved by
60.3% on a turnout of 50%.
3 Theory and Hypotheses
Our study seeks to fill a gap in the literature by investigating whether online news-
gathering produces any effect on the public’s evaluation of the EU and Eurozone member-
ship. We postulate the existence of a negative effect of online news-gathering in citizens’
evaluation of the EU and the Euro, building our theoretical argument on three blocks.
First, we argue that traditional media in Ireland hold a moderate, often positive, position
towards the EU. Second, the low cost of information production and provision on the
Internet mean that it is a space where information and arguments supporting extreme
stands in political debates are more easily encountered than is the case with traditional
media. Third, we argue that the context of the crisis accentuates the viability of negative
views on the EU.
The Irish media market can be classified as belonging to the North Atlantic model,
with a strong tradition of public broadcasting (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), and it is mostly
committed to a reporting style that, while not immune from certain forms of bias (Bran-
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denburg, 2005), is not characterised by ideological polarization2. Neither print media nor
radio and television broadcasters show signs of fragmentation or political radicalism. As
such, Irish traditional media are quite homogeneous and tend to be perceived as moder-
ately supportive of the European Union3. Furthermore, the three largest Irish parties -
Fianna Fa´il, Fine Gael and the Labour party - have all displayed long term support for
Europe and have engaged in pro-EU referenda campaigns on multiple occasions (Franklin,
Marsh and McLaren 1994; Garry, Marsh and Sinnott 2005; Marsh 2007). It is thus highly
unlikely that mainstream media would neglect to cover pro-EU positions, which have
also typically been advocated by Ireland’s major Trade Unions and business organizations
(Garry, Marsh and Sinnott 2005). Importantly for our theory-building exercise, the tra-
ditional media tend to present only one side of the ‘story’. The 2009 PIREDEU media
study,(REF) shows that only 41% of the EU-related media stories mention more than one
side of an issue/problem, with this figure dropping as low as 26% in Ireland. For those
citizens whose media menu is limited to traditional media, we can thus expect opinions to
be strongly channelled in the relatively pro-EU direction fostered by those media.
Our second theoretical contention is built upon the peculiar position of the Internet
in news production. The costs of online news production are much lower than those as-
sociated with any other type of media; the world wide web offers both a higher volume of
information and a more diverse set of information producers to its consumers. Further-
more, while online news meets demands from the mainstream, it is also particularly suited
to providing content for niches. The notion that the Internet creates a marketplace that
can cater to a long-tail of diffuse preferences (see: Anderson, 2007) which was originally
elaborated in relation to Amazon’s books sales - applies to political information as well as
goods. While the Internet offers repackaged information already available oﬄine, it also
gives voice to opinions that would not be otherwise represented in the traditional media.
Nie et al. (2010: 341) offer the first theoretical account - accompanied by an empirical
evaluation - of how the Internet has changed the supply of political news. According to
their framework, the Internet saturates the political space, overlapping with mainstream
media at the centre of the distribution of political opinions, but providing a unique media
space for the extremes. We adapt Nie et al.’s a framework to seek to understand the
2No openly politically-biased TV channels exist and the licensed pay-per-view cable TV channels that
operate in Ireland mostly target precise portions of the market, offering mainly sports packages tailored
to 18-35 year-old males http : //www.bci.ie/licensedoperators/tvservicesindex.html [25/10/2012]
3Influential journalist Vincent Browne, on the website he co-founded in 2009, openly accused RTE of
being ’timorous and unprofessional’ in reporting on the supposed impossibility of Ireland applying to a
second IMF bailout programme if the Fiscal Compact referendum was rejected at the polls [RT ’timorous
and unprofessional’ on IMF story online at: http://www.politico.ie/media-watch/8524-sunday-times-imf-
fiscal-treaty-rte.html
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broadcasting of attitudes towards the EU in Ireland, assuming that the mainstream media
cover the centre of the spectrum of attitudes - while the extremes of opinion that do not
find space on TV, radio or the printed press are expressed online.
As Ireland’s mainstream media are moderately favorable towards the EU, the Internet
should thus provide a space for extremely negative positions on the EU. Examples abound.
The Irish Times issued a report on “The changing media landscape in Ireland between
2002-2008 and its implications for public opinion about the European Union” at the end
of 2008.4 The main focus of the report is on the position of the Irish media onthe ‘yes’
and ‘no’ campaigns during EU referenda. The report argues that bulletin boards like Pol-
itics.ie and Boards.ie,5 and blogs are skewed against the EU and that they contain largely
anti-establishment messages. Moreover, the report claims that no positive online forum on
the EU was present in Ireland in 2008. The report draws the following conclusion on the
relationship between the Internet and the position of Irish citizens towards the EU (page 6):
“The fragmented No campaign has had a very high presence on the Internet, achieving
high rankings on Google and other search engines. The Internet has allowed direct citizen-
publisher interaction and works widely outside the standard news-cycle so has been the
seeding source for many opinion formers.”
Moreover, there are no indications that the prevailing negative attitude of the Irish
blogosphere towards the Euro and the EU’s management of the crisis have changed since
2008. The Cedar Lounge Revolution Blog, winner or the Best Irish political blog award in
2009 and 2011, is openly biased against the EU/IMF/ECB ’Troika’.6 Posts with negative
and sensational titles like ’Is the EU becoming the ’Fourth Reich’?’ continue to attract
high numbers of hits and replies on fora such as politcs.ie.7
The final key element in our theoretical account of the influence of the Internet on
the attitudes of Irish citizens towards the EU is the information context created by the
economic crisis. The origins of the crisis and the proposed solutions to it remain obscure to
most citizens, whose most vivid concern is living with its consequences. In researching the
4The document is available at http : //www.irishtimes.com/focus/2008/ [accessed on October 4,
2012.]
5Politics.ie is run and owned by David Cochrane, campaign manager of Libertas, which was of one
of the principal ‘no’ campaign groups in the two referenda to ratify the EU Constitution. ’Politics.ie
is Ireland’s leading politics and current affairs website with more than 900,000 visitors a month’ http :
//www.politics.ie.
6Available at http : //cedarlounge.wordpress.com/2012/02/01/privatisation − the − troika − the −
government− and− us/ [10/10/2012].
7For instance, this particular post received about 10,000 views. http :
//www.politics.ie/forum/europe/156084− eu− becoming − fourth− reich.html [16/03/2011]
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decline of trust in the ECB, Jones notes that: “people who [...] are exposed to conflicting
views in the media are likely to become more ambivalent and they may become openly
distrustful as the disagreement wears on.”(2009: 1098). In such a scenario, where ordinary
citizens are too overwhelmed by complex information to be able to effectively process all
the information, we argue that negative messages can be particularly effective.
The literature on negative campaign advertising indicates that negative messages are
increasingly pervasive in contemporary politics and it is widely acknowledged that neg-
ative messages appear to be more memorable than positive ones (Lau et al. 2007). A
disproportionate impact of negative news on opinion formation has also been found in
relation to citizens’ evaluation of candidates and parties during US presidential election
campaigns (Lau, 1982; 1985; Holbrook et al. 2001). Soroka (2006) shows that public opin-
ion reacts asymmetrically to economic information, finding that negative news appears
to exert a stronger effect than positive news. Importantly, there is also a large body of
literature in psychology showing that “bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker
to form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones” (Baumeister et al., 2001:
323). Put simply, bold negative statements play well during periods of economic turmoil.
We combine these three elements and formulate the following working hypothesis:
HP: Individuals who browse the Internet for political news are more likely to hold the EU
responsible for the current economic crisis than individuals who do not.
We have described the traditional Irish media as moderately favorable towards the
EU and presented the Internet as the ideal space for extreme views to gather visibility.
Given that the web provides a space for extreme positions on both sides of a debate, we
should also take account of the possibility that the Internet could also provide a space for
particularly positive evaluations of the EU and the Euro. However, while such a possibility
cannot be ruled out on paper, there is no substantive evidence available of the existence of
a pro-EU blogosphere or other significant online space in Ireland, nor elsewhere in the EU
for that matter. Therefore, we expect the distribution of online political information on
this issue to be one-tailed tending to attribute blame to the EU and Euro for the current
crisis.
4 Research Design
In what follows we describe our methodological approach, test our hypotheses and provide
additional evidence using a reduced-form approach.
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4.1 Survey Data
The Irish National Election Study (INES) is a five-wave panel study that initially covered
the period 2002-2007, encompassing the Irish general elections of 2002 and 2007. The
2011 general election held on February 25th 2011 was called, somewhat unexpectedly, on
February 1st following the Green party’s withdrawal from government on January 23rd.
The 2011 wave of the INES aggregates data from 1,863 electors, interviewed by the polling
company Red C during the election campaign. To date, follow-up waves have not been
planned8. The study asked respondents about their experience of the campaign, their
voting behavior, their media usage, and also about their political attitudes and socio-
economic background.
4.1.1 Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable captures the extent to which respondents blame the EU and the
Euro for the economic crisis. More specifically, our outcome variable is built on the fol-
lowing question from the INES survey:
“In the past few years the economy has been in recession. How responsible, if at all, are
each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? Extremely
responsible (4), Very responsible (3), moderately responsible (2), A little responsible (1),
Not at all responsible (0), Don’t know (5)”.
The question lists several political and economic actors including the EU and the
Euro. We drop the ‘don’t know’ answers, so we exclude 118 observations for the question
on the EU and 184 observations for the question on the Euro.9 The resulting variables
are ordinal and range between 0 and 4. Figure 1 (Appendix) shows the distribution of the
two outcome variables.
4.1.2 Treatment
We code a binary variable D that takes a value of 1 for respondents who browse online
news at least once per week and 0 for respondents who never do so. The set of respondents
who browse online news is defined as our treatment group, whereas the set of respondents
who do not go online is defined as our control group (Rubin 1974; Rosenbaum 2002).
Furthermore, we define Y1 and Y0 as the potential outcomes under treatment and control;
that is, the levels of blaming the EU and the Euro that a respondent would have with
8Nor has a dataset integrated with the previous waves been released.
9Our results are not sensitive to this decision.
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and without going online for news. For each respondent, the effect of Internet exposure is
defined as the difference between these two potential outcomes (Y1 − Y0).
Specifically, our treatment is built on the following question from the 2011 INES sur-
vey:
“On a scale of 0-7 where 0 means ‘never’, 1 means one day a week, 2 means two days a
week, and so on until 7 means ‘every day’ of the week, how often do you browse online for
news”.
We recoded this ordinal variable as a dummy to facilitate the interpretation of our
results. We could also think of browsing online for news as an ordinal treatment, but that
would further complicate the identification strategy (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008; Kern
and Hainmueller 2009, 383). Our results are similar if we code as zero those respondents
who browse online for political news only once a week. In our dataset, 311 respondents
go online to browse for political news, i.e., 20 percent of our sample. Figure 2 (Appendix)
shows the distribution of this variable.
4.1.3 Covariates
As Kern and Hainmueller (2009: 387) note, “Even though the use of a natural experiment
reduces the danger of confounding, some imbalances between the treatment and control
groups might exist”. Rosenbaum (1984) warns of the dangers of post-treatment bias, i.e.,
including variables that are themselves affected by the instrument or the treatment. Thus,
we include covariates parsimoniously.
In the baseline model we include important economic characteristics, such as living in
rural areas, income, level of education, and age. This is standard practice in individual-
level data analysis. Moreover, in the extensive model we also include a variable capturing
how many times a week respondents read newspapers.10 As discussed in the theory section,
Irish newspapers are mildly positive towards the EU, and by including a control variable
for the potential impact of this coverage we account for it in the model. Furthermore, we
add a variable labelled ‘Euroskeptics’ that scores one if respondents are ideologically close
to Sinn Fe´in and/or the United Left Alliance, the two consistently euro-skeptic parties
that occupy the extreme left of the Irish ‘left-right’ continuum.11
10As a robustness check, we also include variables capturing respondents’ consumption of TV, national
radio, and local radio. We obtain similar results, available upon request.
11The question from the survey was the following: We have a number of political parties in Ireland each
of which would like to get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever give your first preference vote
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Figure 3 (Appendix) shows the distributions of the covariates, and the correlation
among covariates is also shown in the Appendix. Missing data are treated as additional
categories, i.e., we do not drop missing values of covariates.
4.2 Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy is similar to that of Kern and Hainmueller (2009, 380-388).
Thus, we follow them closely in order to estimate the causal effect of the Internet on citi-
zens’ propensity to blame the EU and the Euro for the economic crisis.
As is common in social studies, we confront the fundamental problem of causal infer-
ence: the impossibility of observing the counterfactual, i.e., the outcome for the same unit
in the absence of the treatment. The ideal way to overcome this problem when trying to
estimate the causal effect of the Internet on public opinion towards the EU would be to
conduct an experiment. Specifically, if we could randomly assign the possibility of brows-
ing political news online to individuals. Given random assignment, then we could then
simply compare individuals who go online with individuals who do not. The difference in
average attitudes towards the EU and the Euro for the treated group and the control group
would constitute the causal effect of the Internet, since both groups would be comparable
with respect to observed and unobserved confounding factors.
However, with observational data things are more difficult, since browsing for political
news online is not randomly assigned to individuals. One way of comparing individuals
who use the Internet for political news with individuals who do not would be to control
for those characteristics that are likely to affect both the probability of going online and
attitudes towards the EU and Euro. For instance, we could use multivariate regressions or
matching with a set of control variables. However, this approach would not help us with
the issue of selection on the unobservables that are correlated with the treatment and the
outcome variables. This would induce correlation between the dependent variable and the
error term, undermining causal inference.
Instrumental variables are a more effective identification strategy. In particular, we
exploit the fact that not every area in Ireland had broadband coverage during the period
under investigation. We code a binary instrument Z based on information about where
to the following parties? Please use the numbers on this scale to indicate your views, where 1 means ‘not
at all probable’ and 10 means ‘very probable’. We code the variable Euroskeptics one if respondents score
eight or more than eight for either Sinn Fe´in or United Left Alliance, and 0 otherwise.
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respondents live. This dummy variable scores 1 if respondents live in an area with broad-
band coverage and 0 if respondents live in an area without broadband coverage. Figure
4 (Appendix) shows the distribution of this instrument. Since broadband coverage is an
original variable, we detail below how we built this instrument.
We first encoded the geographical location (latitude and longitude) of respondents,
and then performed a search for broadband availability for each respondent’s geographical
location. The 1,754 respondents to the INES 2011 were based in 309 different geographical
locations (six respondents per location in the survey). We searched for broadband coverage
in each location by consulting information supplied by major broadband providers and,
additionally, by using an online service which provides detailed information on broadband
coverage by location (getbroadband.ie).12 For those locations without broadband coverage
we also performed a final check by searching for the keywords “location+broadband” on
google.ie.13 Figure 1 maps locations with and without broadband coverage.
Figure 1 about here
An example demonstrates the precision of our instrument. Carkerbeg is a small vil-
lage in County Cork with less than 1,000 residents. Carkerbeg does not have broadband
coverage. Buttevant is a medieval market town in County Cork with 1,667 residents,
according to the 2006 census. Buttevant is less than five miles away from Carkerbeg.14
However, Digiweb, Eircom, and Vodafone provide broadband coverage in Buttevant. The
monthly price of a subscription ranges from 19 euros to 48 euros depending on the speed.15
We have previously noted that the number of Irish citizens who go online for political
news has increased sharply over the past decade. In the Appendix, we show that only
20 percent of Irish households had a broadband connection in 2006 (CSO 2006). Even
in Dublin, all of which now has full broadband coverage, only 32 percent of households
had broadband connections in 2006. Thus, if the Internet has an effect on Irish citizens’
12This website was accessed between October 2011 and December 2011. Note that the INES survey
was carried out immediately after the election. Updated maps of Broadband coverage released by the
Irish Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources confirm that those areas that we
classified as not covered by broadband services still did not avail of coverage in December 20111, as the
phase of broadband expansion plan sponsored by the Irish government only started in January 2012.
[http : //www.dcenr.gov.ie/Communications/Communications + Development/Rural + Broadband +
Scheme/Rural + Broadband + Scheme.htm] Last accessed on October 30th 2012.
13For all those locations where the location name was present in more than one county, we used the
search: “location+broadband+constituency”.
14We calculated the distance using the STATA 12 command GEODIST.
15Information available on getbroadband.ie [accessed in December 2011].
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attitudes towards the EU, such an effect is the product of a recent shock produced by
technological change and not of a long-term trend.
Combining our treatment D with our instrument Z and relying on terminology used
by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), we distinguish four categories:
1. D0 = 0 and D1 = 1. Compliers are respondents who browse for political news online
if they live in areas with broadband coverage, but who do not browse for political
news online if they live in areas without broadband coverage.
2. Always-takers: D1 = D0 = 1. These are respondents who always browse for political
news online, no matter where they live.
3. Never-takers: D1 = D0 = 0. Similarly, these are respondents who never browse for
political news online, no matter where they live.
4. Defiers: D0 = 1 and D1 = 0. These are respondents who browse for political news
online if they live in an area without broadband coverage, but who do not browse
for political news online if they live in areas with broadband coverage.
Compliers amount to 43 percent in our sample.16 In the Appendix we show some
socio-economic characteristics of compliers versus the characteristics of the other three
categories. The two groups appear to be well-balanced in relation to these variables.17
Although we cannot individually identify compliers in our sample, IV estimations in gen-
eral, and LARF estimators in particular, allow us to estimate average treatment effects
for the subgroup of compliers under certain assumptions that we will discuss in the next
subsection.
4.2.1 Identification Assumptions
According to Abadie (2003, 234-235), the following four non-parametric assumptions allow
one to identify causal effects in an instrumental variable (IV) model, where: Y represents
the potential outcome, Z is the instrument, i.e., living in an area with broadband coverage,
D is the treatment, i.e., if an individual looks at political news online, and X represents a
vector of covariates.
1. Independence of the instrument: conditional on X, the random vector (Y00, Y01, Y10,
Y11, D0 and D1) is independent of Z for each z ∈ (0, 1).
16See the Appendix for a breakdown of the 4 categories, i.e., Online, ∼ Online, Broadband, and ∼
Broadband.
17All these variables come from the 2011 INES survey and are described in the Appendix.
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2. Exclusion of the instrument: P(Y1d = Y0d|X) = 1 for D ∈ (0, 1).
3. First stage: 0 < P (Z = 1|X) < 1 and P(D1 = 1|X) > P (D0 = 1|X).
4. Monotonicity: P(D1 ≥ D0|X) = 1.
Let us explore whether these assumptions are met for the data analyzed in this article.
We begin with the most innocuous assumptions. Assumption four requires that it is not
the case that there are people who would have browsed for political news online if they
had lived in an area without broadband coverage, but would not have browsed for political
news online if they had lived in an area with broadband coverage. It is safe to rule out
this possibility as it seems highly unlikely.18
Assumption three requires that Z (broadband coverage) is a strong instrument for D
(browsing the Internet for news). In other words, Z must be highly correlated with D
conditional on X. Figure 4 (Appendix) shows that living in an area without broadband
coverage is strongly correlated with the probability of not browsing for political news on-
line. Only a few respondents who live in areas without broadband coverage browse for
political news once or twice in a week. Conversely, living in an area with broadband
coverage is strongly associated with browsing for political news online.19 The correlation
between Z (broadband coverage) and D (browsing the Internet for news) is 0.41. More-
over, when we regress broadband coverage on online news-gathering controlling for a large
number of covariates, broadband coverage is statistically significant and the t-statistic is
greater than 10.
Assumption one and assumption two are trickier to justify. Assumption one states
that the area in which a respondent lives is ‘as good as randomly assigned’ once we con-
dition on control variables. Assumption two states that Z (broadband coverage) explains
variation of the dependent variable only through its effect on D (browsing for news online).
These two assumptions together imply that once we control for a set of covariates, living in
an area without broadband per se should not impact directly on respondents’ propensity
to blame the EU and the Euro for the crisis (but, instead, should do so only through D).
18We acknowledge that people mary access the Internet via 3G devices and/or access internet at the
workplace. However, as long as 3G use or accessing the Internet from work is not systematically related to
broadband access, our effects should still be identified. What is more, such a possibility may run against
our effect. Indeed, if people in places with no broadband availability have other means of accessing the
Internet, our effects should be underestimated.
19See the Appendix for further details.
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A way to make sure that these two assumptions are met is to show that areas with
broadband coverage are similar to areas without broadband coverage in relation to char-
acteristics that might affect attitudes towards the EU during the crisis. We can rely on
an extensive number of individual-level characteristics from our survey and we use them
to explore how balanced the two groups are. In particular, we focus on socio-economic
characteristics; use of media other than the Internet; political attitudes; levels of trust in
institutions; and concerns about respondents’ economic situation.20
Before showing that assumptions one and two hold, we provide some insights into
how the process of broadband diffusion across Ireland has unfolded. Ireland lags signifi-
cantly behind the EU and the OECD in terms of broadband penetration. In May 2011
the Department of Communications, Energy and natural Resources launched two parallel
schemes, one national and one focusing on rural areas, to counter the remarkably low
diffusion of broadband connections across the island of Ireland. However the scheme’s
target of 50% of the population being covered is expected to be met only in 2015. 21
While rural areas particularly suffer from a lack of broadband availability, an engineer at
the Commission for Communications Regulation (ComReg), interviewed by the authors
in December 2011, pointed out that “broadband penetration has been often developed
randomly by the Irish government. This happened due to a lack of institutional capacity.
It was not infrequent that certain areas originally included in a plan to extend broadband
coverage remained left out because of a sudden shortage of financial resources”.22
We begin by discussing balance in terms of socio-economic characteristics. As Figure
2 shows, respondents in areas with broadband coverage are very similar to respondents
in areas without broadband coverage in terms of age, income, occupational status, and
social class. Only the average level of education and knowledge about politics appear to be
higher in areas with broadband coverage compared to areas without broadband coverage,
though the median is the same.
Figure 2 about here
With regard to traditional media use, Figure 3 shows that respondents in areas with
broadband coverage watch TV as much as respondents in areas without broadband cov-
20All of these variables are described in the Appendix.
21[http : //www.dcenr.gov.ie/Communications/Communications + Development/Rural +
Broadband + Scheme/Rural + Broadband + Scheme.htm] Last accessed on November 9th 2012.
22In releasing this statement the ComReg engineer required anonymity at the time of the interview. We
note here that we are not the first to argue that broadband access is randomly assigned. For a similar
research design, see a study on the role of the Internet in sex crime in Norway (Bhuller et al. 2011).
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erage. Similarly, the variables that capture how frequently respondents listen to national
and local radio in a week appear to be balanced between the two groups. The variable that
captures how frequently respondents read newspapers is the only one to show a different
median between the two groups, although both groups display a similar distribution. In
the section Additional Evidence, we explore the combined effect of the Internet and tradi-
tional media on attitudes towards the EU in greater detail.
Next, we explore the distribution of political attitudes that might influence attitudes
towards the EU across the two groups (Figure 3). Since the left-right dimension is not
particularly meaningful in Irish politics (Coakley and Gallager, 2009), we focus on ques-
tions that describe the position of respondents on the economic and social dimensions.23
Respondents who live in areas with broadband coverage do not appear to be more so-
cially conservative, nor do they appear to be more left-wing economically. Importantly,
responses to the proposition EU unification has gone too far shows a similar distribution
for both groups.
Regarding levels of trust, the distribution of all the questions is well-balanced between
respondents who live in areas with broadband and respondents who live in areas without
broadband (Figure 3). Trust in the police (Gardai) is the only exception, but this vari-
able is unlikely to affect attitudes toward the EU. Again, we highlight that there is no
evidence that respondents in broadband areas are more euro-skeptic that respondents in
non-broadband areas.
Finally, we consider a set of questions that concerns how worried respondents are
about their economic situation. Even for these questions, the two types of constituencies
appear to be well-balanced. This is important because a possible concern with our strat-
egy could be that the crisis may have hit harder in areas without broadband than in areas
with broadband. Such a disparity could drive a negative attitude towards EU policies
during the crisis for respondents who live in areas without broadband. Figure 3 seems to
rule out such a concern.
Figure 3 about here
23In the Appendix we show that that there are similar levels of interest in politics across the two groups.
Moreover, the two groups show similar voting behavior in the previous general election (held in June 2007).
Furthermore, the proportion of voters supporting parties that oppose the EU (Sinn Fe´in and United Left
Alliance) is evenly distributed across groups. Finally, voter turnout in the 2007 election was similar in
areas with and without broadband (the percentage of respondents claiming that voting does not matter is
also roughly the same).
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In sum, there is little evidence that differences among areas with and without broad-
band coverage could pose a threat to the exclusion restriction, especially after including a
large set of covariates.
4.2.2 Estimation Techniques
We implement different models to estimate the causal link between use of the Internet for
political information and the probability of blaming the EU and the Euro for the economic
crisis. In addition to the traditional 2SLS estimation and following Kern and Hainmuller
(2009, 388), we also implement the local average response functions (LARF) estimator
developed by Abadie (2003). LARF does not assume constant treatment effects, but it
allows for heterogeneous treatment effects. Put simply, LARF allows the analyst to esti-
mate the effect of the treatment on an outcome for the sub-population of compliers.
Moreover, LARF seems more appropriate than the Wald estimator (LATE), which
does not incorporate covariates. There may be other channels through which browsing for
news can affect our outcome. LARF allows us to estimate the impact of Internet exposure
on the probability of our outcome variable by averaging across all of the control variables
included into our models.
We adjust standard errors for clustering within the 43 constituencies.24 Following
common practice, we use the Eicker-Huber-White sandwich estimator for the 2SLS mod-
els, whereas we bootstrap (100 replications) standard errors for the LARF estimations
(Davison and Hinkley 1997, 101-103; Kern and Hainmuller 2009, 388).
5 Results
For each dependent variable, we begin by running a na¨ıve ordered probit model in which
we do not instrument for browsing online news. In both models (1) and (6) the coefficient
for online news-gathering (labelled Online in the tables) is negative, although it is sta-
tistically significant at the conventional level only in Model (1). This result implies that
browsing for news online decreases the probability of blaming the EU and the Euro for
the current crisis. As explained above, it is likely that these estimates are confounded by
selection into treatment and so these coefficients are biased.
To correct for this bias we estimate baseline models as well as extensive models using
LARF and 2SLS (Table 2 and Table 3). In both baseline models and extensive models,
24Results are similar if we adjust standard errors for clustering within the 309 locations.
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the Online coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
level. Thus, our analysis implies that people who browse for news online hold place
greater blame on the EU and the Euro for the crisis than people who do not go online.
The magnitude of the effect is substantial, ranging between 1.74 and 1.85 for the ques-
tion on blaming the EU and between 1.76 and 1.92 for the question on blaming the Euro.25
Tables 1 and 2 about here
Another way of showing the effect of the variable Online on our ordinal outcome vari-
ables is to look at the probability of each cut-off point (see Table [XXX] in the Appendix).
For instance, respondents who browse the web for news are 21 percent more likely to
hold the EU and the Euro ‘extremely responsible’ for the crisis. In sum, these findings
indicate that online news-gathering is such an important driver of attitudes towards the
EU that neglecting to include this variable would cause a serious omitted variable problem.
Our findings indicate that browsing for news online has a significant positive and
measurable effect on Irish citizens’ propensity to blame the EU and Eurozone membership
for the current economic crisis. Wired citizens attribute greater blame to the EU and the
Euro, ceteris paribus.
5.1 Asking for Help from Geography
Balancing area characteristics is crucial for correctly identifying our models. We im-
plement two further analyses in which we exploit geographical location to sharpen our
identification strategy.26
First, we match broadband coverage (our instrument) on distance from the closest
area in the other group.27 For instance, if an area has broadband coverage, e.g., But-
tevant, we calculated the distance (in miles) from the closest area without broadband
coverage, e.g., Carkerbeg. Closely located areas are likely to have more balanced char-
acteristics than areas that are far away from one another. For instance, we know that
25Regarding 2SLS, (1) the Kleibergen-Paap test shows that our models are not under-identified; (2)
the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is always greater than 10; (3) the Hansen J statistic shows that our
equations are exactly identified.
26Ideally, we would like to implement spatial regression discontinuity looking at neighboring areas.
However, such an analysis would be problematic in our case since we can only rely on an average of six
respondents per area. Moreover, we are unable to consider area boundaries as discontinuity, since we do
not know respondents’ place of residence at such a disaggregated level.
27For a similar approach, see: Imai and Van Dyk, 2004.
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socio-economic characteristics are usually geographically clustered. The Kernel distribu-
tion of the variable Distance is provided in the Appendix. Moreover, we also match on
two other variables: rural areas and newspapers. We do this because these two variables
are slightly unbalanced in areas with and without broadband.
By matching, we ‘exclude’ 176 observations in areas with broadband and 14 in areas
without broadband. Although the number of unmatched observations is fairly small, the
overall L1 balance measure, which captures imbalance with respect to the full joint distri-
bution, drops significantly from 0.51 to 0.29, i.e., matching reduces the imbalance of the
full joint distribution by more than 40 percent. We run our main models again without
these unmatched observations, obtaining similar results (Table 13 and Table 14 in the
Appendix).
Second, we run the baseline models only for the sub-sample of areas for which the
variable Distance takes values of lower than 12 miles (cases where areas with and without
broadband are not further than 12 miles away). 12 is the value of the 75th percentile of
Distance distribution.28 Once again, the rationale for doing this is to improve the balance
of area’ characteristics. In the Appendix we show that the Education and Newspaper
variables, which are partially unbalanced in the full sample, are perfectly balanced for
geographical units that are 12-miles away from each other. Even with this rather conser-
vative sub-sample, Table 15 (in the Appendix) shows that our results remain unchanged.
6 Additional Evidence
In the following subsections, we further explore the implications and robustness of our
main findings. Tables and figures that show the results of these additional analyses are
available in the Appendix.
6.1 A Placebo Test
Previous results show that respondents who browse for news online are significantly more
likely to blame the EU and the Euro for the current economic crisis than respondents who
do not. However, so far our analysis has not provided a direct test of the mechanism linking
Internet use as a news source to attitudes towards the EU. To rule out the possibility of a
spurious relationship between these variables, we run a placebo test on models that have
a dependent variable that is theoretically unrelated to the variable Online. Specifically,
28Our results are similar if we take Distance < 10. Data available upon request.
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we use a variable capturing whether a respondent has any dependent children under 16.
Browsing for news online should be orthogonal to this outcome and so no effect should
be found. Details of the results of the placebo test are provided in the Appendix. Here
it is enough to say that the variable Online is not statistically significant in these models.
Thus, we can confidently claim that there is a specific link between using the Internet as
a news source and attitudes towards the EU.
6.2 The Internet and Socio-economic Issues
It might be the case that respondents who use the Internet as a source of news hold dif-
ferent views on several issues - other than EU-related matters - compared to respondents
who do not. That would not undermine our previous results, but it would cast doubt on
the notion that such results are EU-specific. To explore this possibility, we run a series
of tests using dependent variables that are absolutely unrelated to the EU. Luckily, the
INES 2011 is a rich source of alternative dependent variables.
Overall, we find little evidence that respondents who browse for news online hold
different views on socio-economic issues compared to respondents who do not (details of
alternative dependent variables used in such tests are provided in the Appendix, Table 6
and Table 7). Coefficients of the LARF estimator are always not statistically significant
at the conventional level for these alternative dependent variables. Regarding 2SLS, On-
line is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in Model 22 and Model
26. Specifically, respondents who browse the Internet for news appear to hold a more
positive view on immigration and a more negative view on Multi-National Companies
than respondents who do not. However, such results do not appear very robust across
model specifications and do not square with the Euro-skeptic tendency towards social
conservatism.
6.3 Informed Citizens and the Internet
One of the key findings of our analysis is that informed citizens are more like to blame the
EU and the Euro for the current crisis. As we highlighted above, this result runs partially
against the previous literature, as well as against the conventional wisdom claiming that
negative attitudes towards the EU can be explained by a lack of knowledge of EU institu-
tions and policies (Sattler and Urpelainen 2012). We use questions from the INES survey
designed to unveil knowledge about politics, finding that individuals who browse for news
online are more knowledgeable about politics than people who never go online (details in
the Appendix).
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6.4 Robustness Checks
We implement a large number of robustness checks to further validate our findings. We
begin by accounting for heterogeneity among geographical areas in Ireland, given that
geography plays a key role in this study. We drop the Dublin area, in which every sub-
area has broadband coverage, to make sure that Dublin-specific characteristics are not
driving our results. Moreover, we include constituency fixed effects in the 2SLS regressions
to control for confounding factors at the level of the 43 Irish electoral constituencies.29
Second, we re-run our main analysis replacing our treatment with an ordinal variable, i.e.
number of days (per week) in which people browse for news online. Third, we explore the
effect of the Internet in combination with traditional media on attitudes towards the EU.
Fourth, to control for violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA),
we use the median score of the outcome variables by area. Finally, we replicate our analysis
on a survey held during the 2012 Irish referendum on the Fiscal Compact. Over all of
these checks, our main results do not change and details are provided in the Appendix.
7 Conclusion
This paper has explored the role of the Internet in the Irish public’s evaluation of the
responsibility of the European Union and the Euro common currency for the on-going
economic crisis. The provision of respondent geo-location in the 2011 INES survey data,
together with detailed geographical information on broadband availability in the Republic
of Ireland, has allowed us to assess the differences that exist between individuals who use
the Internet to gather news and individuals who do not. Our findings show that indi-
viduals who use the Internet to gather political news attribute greater blame to the EU
and the Euro for the economic crisis. Controlling for levels of political information and
knowledge, we find consistent evidence that the Internet has an impact in forming political
evaluations towards the EU and Euro.
Additionally, we have performed several checks of the robustness of this finding, in-
cluding: a placebo test; an analysis controlling particularly for the effects of alternative
media; an analysis controlling for the personal impact of the economic downturn on re-
spondents; and a number of tests for geographical location, which, by controlling for
individuals’ distance from the capital, allowed us to rule out the effect of an urban/rural
cleavage. Our special concern with the crucial role played by geography in our research
design was further tested by implementing matching techniques. In each and every of the
29We are unable to use area fixed effects, since we have an average of six respondents per area and our
instrument does change within each area.
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above-mentioned checks the main results remained unchanged.
In line with previous studies, we find media use to be causally linked to citizens’ po-
litical opinions. In the Theory section, we hypothesized that the Internet would act as an
environment where negative attitudes towards the EU and the Eurozone would be more
widely expressed than in mainstream media, emphasizing the particular effectiveness of
such negative messages in times of economic crisis. Our working hypothesis is not falsified
by the large set of empirical tests that we have performed. However, our findings, while
empirically sound, are conceptually complex to interpret. Difficulties arise mostly from
two unknown elements in our research design, both of which stem from the difficulty of
characterizing the Internet as a news medium. Firstly, we have no information on what
specific websites were browsed by those citizens who used the Internet for political infor-
mation, and secondly, we do not know the content of those websites that were browsed.
The long tail theory describes a mechanism through which niche demand and supply meet;
the implications of such a process remain mostly overlooked. By shedding some light on
the effects of Internet news supply on public opinion, we seek to contribute to filling this
lacuna. Future research on the effects of online news-gathering should aim to open this
black box in order to better understand type of extra information the Internet provides
citizens with. Ideally, a laboratory experiment, where the content administered can be
controlled and manipulated, may clarify how and what type of online content exercises
pervasive effects.
Our study clearly speaks to the literature on the role of information on attitudes
towards the EU and the integration process, but more broadly it contributes to the lit-
erature on ‘media effects’ from a new angle, by specifically assessing the role of online
news-gathering. Using a quasi-experimental set-up, we have uncovered findings that indi-
cate that the Internet produces different, and in fact opposite, outcomes on public opinions
compared to traditional media. Moreover, our study engages with the recent literature that
explores public attitudes on the crisis (Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 2012; Marsh
and Mikhaylov 2012). By bringing the Internet into the picture, we have unveiled how
online news- gathering can emphasize extreme opinions by providing a space for actors
and voices that are not visible on mainstream media, and crucially we have demonstrated
how effective such messages can be.
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Table 1: Is the EU responsible for the crisis? LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust
standard errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The baseline
model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. The extensive model also adds Reading
newspapers and Being ideologically close to Sinn Fe´in and United Left Alliance. Response categories for
the outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’
2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ordered Probit LARF LARF 2SLS 2SLS
Online -0.15 1.85 1.75 1.83 1.74
[-0.28, -0.02] [0.44, 3.27] [0.35, 3.16] [0.86, 2.80] [0.80, 2.68]
First Stage
Broadband 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18
[0.14, 0.21] [0.15, 0.21] [0.14, 0.21] [0.15, 0.21]
F Statistics 50.6 36.2 50.6 36.2
Online instrumented no yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes no yes no
Extensive model no no yes no yes
Observations 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Table 2: Is the Euro responsible for the crisis? LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust
standard errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The baseline
model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. The extensive model also adds Reading
newspapers and Being ideologically close to Sinn Fe´in and United Left Alliance. Response categories for
the outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’
2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ordered Probit LARF LARF 2SLS 2SLS
Online -0.10 1.92 1.80 1.91 1.76
[-0.23, 0.03] [0.37, 3.48] [0.72, 2.88] [0.95, 2.87] [0.84, 2.67]
First Stage
Broadband 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18
[0.14, 0.21] [0.15, 0.21] [0.14, 0.21] [0.15, 0.21]
F Statistics 49.6 37.6 49.6 37.6
Online instrumented no yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes no yes no
Extensive model no no yes no yes
Observations 1570 1570 1570 1570 1570
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Figure 1: Geographical distribution of the instrument.
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Figure 2: Areas with broadband coverage versus areas without broadband coverage. The
graphs show the balance in socio-economic characteristics between the two groups.
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Figure 3: Areas with broadband coverage versus areas without broadband coverage. The
graphs show the balance in area’ characteristics in relation to media, political attitudes,
trust, and concerns about the crisis.
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APPENDIX – Lost in Transmission: Evaluating Internet Effects on
Citizens’ Attitudes Towards the European Union in Times of Crisis
Distributions of Dependent Variable and Covariates
Figure 4: Distribution of the dependent variables. Note: ‘don’t know’ are coded five.
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Figure 5: Distribution of treatment and instrument.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the covariates.
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Figure 7: Browsing online news in villages with and without broadband.
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Correlation Among Covariates
Table 3: Correlation among covariates.
Rural Income Education Age Left Newspaper
Rural 1
Income 0.01 1
Education -0.11 0.22 1
Age 0.03 -0.03 -0.35 1
Left -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 1
Newspaper -0.10 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.02 1
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Compliers versus Defiers
Table 4: Respondents are broken down into Online and Broadband.
Online Broadband
yes no
yes 446 997
no 19 292
Figure 8: The graphs show balance in compliers’ versus defiers’ characteristics.
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Broadband Coverage in 2006
Table 5: Percentage of households with and without broadband for a selected sample of
Irish towns in 2006 – Central Statistics Office data. Note: ‘Total’ is not calculated on this
sample.
City Broadband Connection No Broadband Connection
Dublin 31% 69%
Cork 18% 82%
Galway 17% 83%
Limerick 16% 84%
Carlow 13% 87%
Monaghan 10% 90%
Total 20% 80%
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Assumption 1 and Assumption 2
Figure 9: Villages with broadband coverage versus villages without broadband coverage.
The graphs show the balance in village characteristics in relation to political attitude.
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Assumption 4
Table 6: Browsing online news in villages with and without broadband.
Browsing political news Living in
online (days pw) villages without broadband villages with broadband
0 425 945
1 21 52
2 19 41
3 0 56
4 0 47
5 0 35
6 0 30
7 0 83
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Effect
Table 7: Effect of the internet on blaming the EU. Note: values of covariates set at their
median.
Cutoff Prob. (Online 0 → 1) CI
0 -0.07 [-0.09, -0.04]
1 -0.11 [-0.16, -0.06]
2 -0.10 [-0.15, -0.04]
3 0.07 [0.04, 0.09]
4 0.21 [0.10, 0.33]
Table 8: Effect of the internet on blaming the Euro. Note: values of covariates set at their
median.
Cutoff Prob. (Online 0 → 1) CI
0 -0.14 [-0.20, -0.07]
1 -0.11 [-0.16, -0.05]
2 -0.03 [-0.07, -0.004]
3 0.06 [0.03, 0.08]
4 0.22 [0.09, 0.35]
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Asking for help from geography
Figure 10: Distribution of Distance.
Figure 11: The graphs show balance in close villages socio-economic and political attitude
characteristics.
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Table 9: Geography, matching, and the Internet. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust
standard errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. Matching
on Distance from the closest village in the other (i.e. treatment vs. control) group, Rural areas, and
Newspaper. The baseline model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. The extensive
model also adds Reading newspapers and Being ideologically close to Sinn Fe´in and United Left Alliance.
Response categories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’
1, ‘moderately responsible’ 2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(49) (50) (51) (52)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
EU responsible Euro responsible
Online 1.89 1.86 1.90 1.89
[0.76, 3.01] [0.91, 2.80] [0.72, 3.08] [0.83, 2.94]
Online instrumented no yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes
Matching yes yes yes yes
Observations 1446 1446 1397 1397
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Table 10: Only villages with Distance <= 12. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust
standard errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The baseline
model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. Response categories for the outcome
variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’ 2, ‘very
responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(57) (58) (59) (60)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
EU responsible Euro responsible
Online 1.39 1.39 1.30 1.28
[0.38, 2.40] [0.44, 2.34] [0.08, 2.52] [0.29, 2.28]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes
Observations 1735 1143 1731 1731
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Placebo Tests
The results below show that we can safely rule out the possibility that those individuals
who browse online news differ from individuals who do not go online in relation to depen-
dent children. Since the outcome variable is a dummy, we run a biprobit model in addition
to LARF and 2SLS.
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Table 11: Placebo Tests. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS and Biprobit: robust standard
errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The extensive model
includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, Age, Euro-skepticism, and Newspaper. Response cat-
egories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘any dependent children under 16’ 0 and ‘no dependent
children under 16’ 1.
(17) (18) (19)
LARF 2SLS Biprobit
Children Dependent
Online 0.10 0.10 -0.11
[-0.64, 0.84] [-0.20, 0.41] [-0.64, 0.43]
Online instrumented yes yes yes
Extensive model yes yes yes
Observations 1754 1754 1754
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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The Internet and Socio-economic Issues
First, we begin by recalling the question on which our two dependent variables were orig-
inally built:
“In the past few years the economy has been in recession. How responsible, if at all, are
each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? Extremely
responsible (4), Very responsible (3), moderately responsible (2), A little responsible (1),
Not at all responsible (0), Don’t know (5)”.
Among the other institutions listed in this question there are Irish government and
bankers. In line with our previous analysis, we drop the ‘don’t know’ answers. Table
5 (in the Appendix) shows that respondents who go online are not more likely to blame
these institutions as responsible for the crisis. Regarding the Irish government, the neg-
ative coefficient of Online is particularly interesting, given the extremely low popularity
of the Fianne Fa´il government at the time in which the survey was conducted. We find
that respondents who browse online news are less likely to blame their government for the
crisis, although the coefficients are not statistically significant at the conventional level.
Second, we rely on the following question, which allows us to test the effect of the internet
on some crucial socio-economic issues:
“I will now read out some statements. Please tell me to what extent you Disagree or Agree
with each statement. ‘strongly disagree’ 0, ‘disagree’ 1, ‘disagree slightly’ 2, ‘neither agree
or disagree’ 3, ‘slightly agree’ 4, ‘agree’ 5, ‘strongly agree’ 6.”.
Specifically, we use four statements from this question. The first two statements captures
the effect of the internet on issues related to the social dimension, whereas the last two
questions captures the effect of the internet on issues related to the economic dimension.
1. “There should be very strict limits on the number of immigrants coming to live in
Ireland”;
2. “A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her
children as a mother who stays at home”;
3. “The presence of large international companies is good for the Irish economy”;
4. “Ireland should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national
economy”;
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The results below show that we can safely rule out the possibility that those individuals
who browse online news hold different views on socio-economic issues compared to indi-
viduals who do not go online.
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Table 12: Other institutions responsible for the crisis. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS:
robust standard errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The
extensive model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, Age, Being ideologically closed to
Euroskeptics parties, and Newspaper. Response categories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘not
at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’ 2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely
responsible’ 4.
(17) (18) (19) (20)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
Government responsible Bankers responsible
Online -0.54 -0.52 -0.005 -0.001
[-2.16, 1.08] [-1.09, 0.05] [-0.66, 0.66] [-0.49, 0.49]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Extensive model yes yes yes yes
Observations 1735 1735 1731 1731
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Table 13: Social dimension. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust standard errors clustered
by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The extensive model includes Living in
rural areas, Income, Education, Age, Being ideologically closed to Euroskeptic parties, and Newspaper.
Response categories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘strongly disagree’ 0, ‘disagree’ 1, ‘disagree
slightly’ 2, ‘neither agree or disagree’ 3, ‘slightly agree’ 4, ‘agree’ 5, ‘strongly agree’ 6.
(21) (22) (23) (24)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
Limits to immigration Working mother
Online -1.23 -1.17 0.88 0.84
[-2.74, 0.29] [-2.64, -0.07] [-1.29, 3.04] [-0.31, 1.98]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Extensive model yes yes yes yes
Observations 1754 1754 1754 1754
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Table 14: Economic dimension. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust standard errors
clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The extensive model includes
Living in rural areas, Income, Education, Age, Being ideologically closed to Euroskeptic parties, and
Newspaper. Response categories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘strongly disagree’ 0, ‘disagree’ 1,
‘disagree slightly’ 2, ‘neither agree or disagree’ 3, ‘slightly agree’ 4, ‘agree’ 5, ‘strongly agree’ 6.
(25) (26) (27) (28)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
Positive view on MNCs Limits to imports
Online -1.43 -1.41 -1.25 -1.19
[-4.22, 1.37] [-2.23, -0.60] [-5.10, 2.60] [-2.41, 0.02]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Extensive model yes yes yes yes
Observations 1754 1754 1754 1754
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
Informed Citizens and the Internet
Since we are unable to capture which website(s) respondents visit, it might be argued that
browsing online news does not always imply being more knowledgeable about politics. In
this section, we explore the impact of the internet on respondents’ political knowledge
relying on several variables from the INES survey. Specifically, we use as dependent
variables answers to the following questions:30
• Who is the current Irish Commissioner to the EU?
• Who is the current First Minister of Northern Ireland?
The dependent variables are ordinal and score zero if respondents know the correct an-
swers. Table 12 shows the results. The variable Online is always negative and statistically
significant at the conventional level. Thus, respondents who browse online news are more
knowledgeable about politics than respondents who do not go online.31
30The question has the following preamble: Now I would like to ask you some factual questions about
politics. It doesn’t matter if you know the answers or not, we are just interested to see how close people
are to politics in Ireland..
31We obtain similar results if we use a variable capturing the interviewer’s recorded judgment on how
knowledgeable the respondent is about politics. We do not rely on this variable as main test since it is a
rather discretionary assessment. Results are available upon request.
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Table 15: Information and the Internet – Economic dimension. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors.
2SLS: robust standard errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage.
The baseline model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. Response categories for
the outcome variables are coded as ‘right answer’ 0, ‘wrong answer’ 1, ‘don’t know’ 2.
(45) (46) (47) (48)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
Irish Commissioner First Minister of Northern Ireland
Online -0.70 -0.71 -0.91 -0.88
[-1.40, -0.02] [-1.31, -0.11] [-1.63, -0.20] [-1.50, -0.27]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes
Observations 1754 1754 1754 1754
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Robustness Checks
Heterogeneity Among Geographical Areas
Table 16: Robustness Checks. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust standard errors
clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The baseline model includes
Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. Response categories for the outcome variables are
coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’ 2, ‘very responsible’ 3,
‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
LARF 2SLS 2SLS LARF 2SLS 2SLS
EU responsible Euro responsible
Online 1.30 1.36 1.69 1.04 1.14 1.98
[0.42, 2.18] [0.49, 2.22] [0.63, 2.75] [0.05, 2.04] [0.13, 2.14] [0.71, 3.25]
Dublin no no yes no no yes
Constituency FE no no yes no no yes
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1211 1211 1636 1153 1153 1570
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Online as Ordinal Variable
With 2SLS our results do not change if we replace our treatment with an ordinal variable
capturing the number of days per week in which people browse online political news.
Conversely, our Online ordinal is not statistically significant at the conventional level with
LARF.
58
Table 17: Is the EU responsible for the crisis? LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust
standard errors clustered by constituency. Online (ordinal) instrumented with broadband coverage. The
baseline model includes living in rural areas, income, education, and age. The extensive model also adds
Reading newspapers and Being ideologically close to Euroskeptic parties. Response categories for the
outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’
2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ordered Probit LARF LARF 2SLS 2SLS
Online -0.05 0.35 0.33 0.02 0.02
[-0.07, -0.02] [0.17, 0.53] [0.16, 0.51] [-0.10, 0.13] [-0.13, 0.18]
Online (ordinal) instrumented no yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes no yes no
Extensive model no no yes no yes
Observations 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Table 18: Is the Euro responsible for the crisis? LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust
standard errors clustered by constituency. Online (ordinal) instrumented with broadband coverage. The
baseline model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. The extensive model also
adds Reading newspapers and Being ideologically close to Euroskeptic parties. Response categories for the
outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’
2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ordered Probit LARF LARF 2SLS 2SLS
Online (ordinal) -0.04 0.20 0.19 -0.06 -0.07
[-0.07, -0.02] [0.01, 0.41] [0.01, 0.39] [-0.21, 0.10] [-0.30, 0.16]
Online instrumented no yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes no yes no
Extensive model no no yes no yes
Observations 1570 1570 1570 1570 1570
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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The Role of Traditional Media
In the theory section, we suggest that traditional media in general, and newspapers in
particular, tend to be biased in favor of the EU. This allows us to indirectly test whether
the internet modifies respondents’ attitude towards the EU or whether respondents select
online news since they are closer to respondents’ political views.32 How do we do that?
We implement two different tests.
First, we split the original sample in two groups: (1) those respondents who read a news-
paper five times or more a week; (2) those respondents who read a newspaper less than five
times a week.33 Then we run our baseline models on these two sub-samples. The results
(Table 8 and Table 9 in the Appendix) shows that Online is still positive and statistically
significant at the conventional level in both sub-samples and for both dependent variables
with 2SLS. For the sub-sample Newspaper<5, Online is not statistically significant at
the conventional level with LARF, although the coefficient is still positive. This might
be explained by the fact that the number of observations is dramatically reduced in this
sub-sample.
In any case, there is preliminary evidence that browsing online news increases the prob-
ability of blaming the EU and the Euro also for those respondents who are exposed to
traditionally pro-EU media, i.e., newspapers. In other words, the more informed respon-
dents are, the more they hold a negative attitude towards the EU during the crisis.
Second, a skeptical reader might still note that there is a large heterogeneity among news-
papers in terms of EU coverage, i.e., some newspapers are pro-EU and some others are
less euro-enthusiastic. We are fortunate that a question from the survey asks which news-
paper(s) respondents regularly use for political information. We rely on this question to
split the original sample into two groups: (1) those respondents who read the Irish Times
and the Irish Independent, which are generally pro-EU newspapers; (2) those respondents
who read the Irish Examiner, the Irish Star, the Evening Herald, and the Irish Sun, which
are less euro-enthusiastic newspapers. Again, we run our baseline models on these two
sub-samples.
Table 10 and Table 11 (in the Appendix) show that the variable Online is positive and
statistically significant at the conventional level in both sub-samples and for both depen-
32For an extensive discussion on news selectivity, see Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2012: 83-104.
33Ideally, we would like to use an interaction term between the variables Online and Newspaper. However,
that would require us to find two other instruments, which we do not have, to endogenize the three variables,
i.e., Online, Newspaper, and the interaction term between these two variables.
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dent variables with 2SLS. When we perform LARF, the coefficients of the variable Online
are not always statistically significant at the conventional level, although they are still
positive. The aforementioned considerations on the sample size hold here as well.
We want to highlight the importance of this result. Even for those respondents who read
regularly the Irish Times and the Irish Independent, browsing online news increases the
probability of a negative attitude towards the EU and the Euro. In sum, there is evidence
that the internet has a blaming effect also for these respondents who are confronted with
different view-points on EU issues. This finding should mitigate the concern that, in
relation to the EU, respondents “make exposure decisions that reflect their predisposition
and [. . . ] prefer attitude-consistent news” (Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2012: 86).
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Table 19: Is the EU responsible for the crisis? – The Internet and Newspapers. LARF: bootstrapped
standard errors. 2SLS: robust standard errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broad-
band coverage. The baseline model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. Response
categories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moder-
ately responsible’ 2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(29) (30) (31) (32)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
Newpaper<5 Newpaper>=5
Online 1.73 1.39 2.17 2.18
[-17.48, 26.27] [0.44, 2.33] [0.93, 3.42] [1.19, 3.17]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes
Observations 676 676 960 960
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Table 20: Is the Euro responsible for the crisis? – The Internet and Newspapers. LARF: bootstrapped
standard errors. 2SLS: robust standard errors clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broad-
band coverage. The baseline model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Education, and Age. Response
categories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moder-
ately responsible’ 2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(33) (34) (35) (36)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
Newpaper<5 Newpaper>=5
Online 1.31 1.31 1.48 1.47
[-7.57, 10.20] [0.06, 2.68] [0.13, 282] [0.16, 2.68]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes
Observations 635 635 1012 1012
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Table 21: Is the EU responsible for the crisis? – The Internet and Pro-EU vs. Anti-EU Newspapers.
LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust standard errors clustered by constituency. Online
instrumented with broadband coverage. The baseline model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Edu-
cation, and Age. Response categories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a
little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’ 2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(37) (38) (39) (40)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
Pro-EU Newspapers Anti-EU Newspaper
Online 1.20 1.20 3.08 2.99
[0.12, 2.28] [0.20, 2.20] [-4.59, 10.75] [1.08, 4.91]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes
Observations 783 783 519 519
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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Table 22: Is the Euro responsible for the crisis? – – The Internet and Pro-EU vs. Anti-EU Newspapers.
LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust standard errors clustered by constituency. Online
instrumented with broadband coverage. The baseline model includes Living in rural areas, Income, Edu-
cation, and Age. Response categories for the outcome variables are coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a
little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’ 2, ‘very responsible’ 3, ‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(41) (42) (43) (44)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
Pro-EU Newspapers Anti-EU Newspapers
Online 1.31 1.31 1.48 1.47
[-7.57, 10.20] [0.06, 2.68] [0.13, 282] [0.16, 2.68]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes
Observations 635 635 1012 1012
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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SUTVA Violations
Within each village, spillover effects could cause the exclusion restriction to fail. For
instance, respondents who do not use the internet, but live in a village with broadband
coverage might learn about online news from neighbors who use the internet. The same
mechanism is not possible in villages without broadband coverage. In other words, we
might violate the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). To check how severe
such violations are, we replicate our analysis using the median value of blaming the EU
and the Euro at the village level as dependent variables. The results are similar in terms of
sign of the coefficient and level of significance, although the magnitude of Online coefficient
is smaller than in previous analyses.
Table 23: SUTVA Violations. LARF: bootstrapped standard errors. 2SLS: robust standard errors
clustered by constituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. The baseline model includes
Living in rural areas, income, Education, and Age. Response categories for the outcome variables are
coded as ‘not at all responsible’ 0, ‘a little responsible’ 1, ‘moderately responsible’ 2, ‘very responsible’ 3,
‘extremely responsible’ 4.
(29) (30) (31) (32)
LARF 2SLS LARF 2SLS
EU Responsible Euro Responsible
Online 2.44 2.59 2.23 2.20
[0.81, 4.08] [1.82, 3.36] [1.28, 3.18] [1.35, 3.05]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Baseline model yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,636 1,636 1,570 1,570
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
2012 Referendum on the European Fiscal Compact
On May 31st the Republic of Ireland voted to amend the Irish constitution in order to
permit Ireland to ratify the 2012 European Fiscal Compact (Treaty on Stability, Coordi-
nation and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union). Although the referendum
is not related to the economic crisis per se, it nonetheless has broad implications for EU
governance, and the poll was presented by domestic and international media as a ‘yes’
vote or ‘no’ vote to Brussels, given the deep political and economic difficulties faced by
the Union.
Irish voters backed the fiscal treaty by a large majority – with 60.3% voting ‘yes’ and
39.7% voting ‘no’. Only five of the 43 Irish constituencies rejected it. This referendum,
which was the only one held in any EU member country on the Fiscal Compact, represents
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an unique opportunity to re-estimate the effect of the internet on attitude towards the EU.
Specifically, we use original data from 1,000 electors interviewed by the polling company
Red C the same day in which the referendum was held. We try to keep the research design
as close as possible to that presented above. Below we describe the main variables.
Our dependent variable is a dummy that scores one if the respondent voted ‘yes’ and zero
if the respondent voted ‘no’.34 Our treatment captures whether or not respondents went
online to browse for political news on the Fiscal Treaty at least once during the referendum
campaign. Importantly, in this survey we are able to know which websites respondents
visit. Specifically, 47% of respondents went online to browse political news; 38% browsed
a newspaper website; 19 % browsed political blogs and forums; 24 % went on the EU
Commission website. As above, we instrument our treatment using broadband coverage.
Finally, we control for age, social grade, working status, level of support for the current
government, and knowledge about the Fiscal Treaty (self-assessed).
In summary we find that: (1) browsing online political news has a negative effect on the
probability of voting ‘yes’ in the referendum on Fiscal Compact; (2) This negative effect
does not depend on the type of websites visited by respondents, i.e., the negative effect
holds across websites; (3) the negative effect also holds for those respondents who visited
both pro-EU websites, e.g. the EU Commission, and Euroskeptic websites, e.g., political
blogs and forums.35 Given the overwhelming majority that the ‘Yes’ vote received in
the referendum, the negative impact of the Internet on approval of the Fiscal Compact
strongly reinforces and further validates the results obtained from the 2011 Irish elections.
34We dropped those observations in which respondents refused to answer, i.e. 24, observations.
35We not are able to use LARF with these data, since the number of compliers is too low. The results are
not sensitive to the type of instrumental variable models used, i.e. we obtain similar results with IVREG,
TREATREG, and BIPROBIT.
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Table 24: 2012 referendum on EU Fiscal Compact. 2SLS: robust standard errors clustered by con-
stituency. Online instrumented with broadband coverage. Control variables include Age, Social status,
Working status, Level of support for the current government, and Knowledge about the Fiscal Treaty
(self-assessed). The outcome variable is coded ’voted no’ 0 and ’voted yes’ 1.
(61) (62) (63) (64)
IVREG IVREG IVREG IVREG
Internet Newspapers (online) Blogs EU Commission website
Online -0.35 -0.32 -0.57 -0.52
[-0.66, -0.08] [-0.59, -0.05] [-0.73, -0.42] [-0.67, -0.37]
Online instrumented yes yes yes yes
Control yes yes yes yes
Constituency FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 960 960 960 960
95 percent confidence interval in parentheses
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